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Abstract
I study equilibria of non-cooperative games between an aid donor and
a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined
budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor’s influence over outcomes
is increasing in the share of the available resources it controls; if this
share is large enough, aid is not fungible. The game-theoretic approach
to fungibility is contrasted with the traditional non-strategic approach. I
argue that the former is superior as it derives final allocations instead of
assuming them, making analysis of the sources of influence over outcomes
possible.
1 Introduction
The continuing debate over the merits of fiscal federalism illustrates that some of
the most complicated issues in public economics arise in inter-jurisdictional fiscal
relations. Both matters of eﬃciency and equity are usually at stake, and the par-
ties involved often evaluate the consequences of diﬀerent institutional arrange-
ments and policies diﬀerently. When the entities belong to diﬀerent sovereign
states, resolving conflicts of interests becomes even harder, since one lacks the
framework generated by common political and juridical institutions. In terms of
conflict resolution, international law and conventions are rarely perfect substi-
tutes for such national institutions. The prime example of inter-governmental
fiscal relations in the international arena is the relationship between a recipient
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of foreign aid and its donors. One way to view this relationship is to see aid
as donor subsidies for certain projects or programmes, in much the same way
as the government of a state (whether federal or unitary) make transfers to
sub-national units. Conflicts between the parties to aid transactions over the
intended outcomes of their joint eﬀorts are a fact of life, current oﬃcial rhetoric
about “partnerships” notwithstanding. Indeed, most of the history of foreign
aid relations might be read as a continual search by the donors to find ways to
maximise the returns to their funds as judged by them, with recipients trying to
make sure that their spending priorities - which have not always been the same
- prevail. Moreover, even though the World Bank now argues for “selectivity”
in choosing recipients (see World Bank 1998), i.e., concentrating assistance in
countries pursuing policies ajudged to be conducive to economic development,
it seems unlikely that disagreements over the allocation of resources will vanish
overnight. Indeed, being selective would not be necessary if there was complete
agreement among the parties involved about how funds should be spent. Knowl-
edge about what outcomes might be expected will therefore still be helpful in
designing aid policies.
An important issue for donors is the extent to which aid is fungible, i.e., can
be redirected, partially or completely, from the intended purpose by the recipient
if it so wishes. If aid is fungible, the evaluation of its impact is complicated by
the diﬃculty of assessing which activities are ultimately supported by the inflow
of funds.1 In turn, this makes the task of designing optimal aid policies harder.
Judging the eﬃciency of development assistance also becomes more complex.
Even though the diversion of funds might improve outcomes from an overall
perspective, for example because donors are overly influenced by commercial or
strategic interests, in order to make an informed judgment one needs to know
into what activities funds leak. Although in the end this is an empirical issue,
a solid theoretical understanding of the problem is an essential prerequisite for
such investigations. Gaining such insight has taken on added importance with
the adoption of the so-called Millennium Development Goals by the international
community. The estimates of the additional aid necessary to achieve them runs
into tens of billions of US dollars.2
The results reported in this paper are derived from first-principles. That is,
instead of assuming diﬀerent degrees of fungibility and discussing their impli-
cations, I analyse the degree of influence that recipients and donors have over
allocation patterns based on the resources available to them, their preferences,
and the manner in which they interact. The game-theoretic approach adopted
here diﬀers from the contract-theoretic framework of Pedersen (1995a,b) and
Azam and Laﬀont (2003).3 These authors assume that donors and recipients
can write binding contracts specifying what the former gets in return for the
grants and subsidised loans passed on to the latter. This fits with the condition-
ality approach to aid adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. However, even though
1For a discussion of the issues involved, see e.g. Devarajan and Swaroop (2000).
2For example, Devarajan, Miller, and Swanson (2002) estimate that an increase of $40-70
billion per year is needed, which amounts to a doubling of oﬃcial aid compared to 2000.
3Also see Svensson (2000) and Torsvik (2002).
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usually agreements between the parties are signed this is not a very fruitful
approach to understanding aid impact. Aid “contracts” cannot be enforced in
courts, and the generally poor record of conditionality demonstrates that such
agreements have not been self-enforcing either.4
I prefer, therefore, to study the outcomes of equilibria of non-cooperative
games between a donor and a recipient. In section 2, I investigate three diﬀerent
types of equilibria of a simple budgetary game by varying the order in which the
players move. Section 3 contains a discussion of aid fungibility in the light of
the game-theoretic approach to the issue, contrasting the results with those of
the traditional non-strategic approach. In section 4, I show that the pattern of
equilibrium outcomes resulting when the budgets of the players are endogenous
correspond closely to those derived in section 2 under the assumption that both
donor and recipient have a fixed amount of resources to allocate. Finally, in
section 5 I summarise and comment on the main results derived in this paper.
2 Modelling the Budgetary Game
2.1 Preferences, Resources, and Order of Moves
Consider the case of a donor agency (D) and a recipient government (R), each
with their own fixed budget, interacting to determine the allocation of their
combined resources among K goods. The players have the following preferences
over the consumption vector X = {x1, ..., xk, ..., xK}, in the recipient country:5
Up (X) =



KX
k=1
β
p
k
(xk)
1−µ
1−µ , µ > 0, µ 6= 1;
KX
k=1
β
p
k lnxk, µ = 1
, p = R,D. (1)
Hence, each xk can be thought of as a collective good for R and D, with
diﬀerent marginal benefits if βDk 6= βRk .6
The resource constraints of the donor and the recipient are
KX
k=1
b
p
k ≤ B
p, b
p
k ≥ 0,∀k, p = D,R. (2)
That is, neither player can spend more than its total budget Bp. Moreover,
the funds allocated to spending on each good must be non-negative. For the
donor this assumption is reasonable, as it cannot tax the recipient. For the
4Empirical studies of conditionality include Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991), Killick
(1995, 1998), Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren (2001), and the World Bank (1998).
5 In this paper I concentrate on cases where µ 6= 1. See Hagen (2002) for the results for
µ = 1 when K = 2.
6For convenience, I assume βpk ∈ (0, 1) ∀k and
KX
k=1
βpk = 1.
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recipient, it is perhaps a bit more restrictive, but it preserves a certain symmetry
between the players. Moreover, it is empirically reasonable: empirical studies of
fungibility rarely find that a marginal increase in aid results in lower spending
on the activity in question.7 Given the assumption, one way to interprete aid
in this model is as project aid, or, even more precisely, as aid in kind: once
the donor has allocated funds for some purpose in the recipient country, these
are turned into actual units of goods and services. However, one could easily
extend this to programme aid as long as the recipient’s ability to tax or transfer
resources across budget categories is limited relative to the donor’s budget.
For any combination of budgetary allocations by the two parties, the con-
sumption of each good is
xk =
bDk + b
R
k
qk
, (3)
where qk is the price of good k. All prices are assumed to be constant.8
Choosing good 1 to be the numeraire, I set q1 = 1.
The “first-best” allocation of each actor - the allocation that it would have
chosen if it could dictate how the combined resources ofD and R should be spent
- is found by maximising Up (X) subject to
KX
k=1
b
p
k ≤ B, where B = BD + BR.
The result is
x
p∗
k =
σ
p
kB
qk
, p = D,R, (4)
with σpk =
(βpk)
1
µ (qk)
µ−1
µPK
l=1(β
p
l )
1
µ (ql)
µ−1
µ
being the optimal share of the common budget
spent on good l from player p’s perspective. Let Xp∗ =
©
x
p∗
1 , ..., x
p∗
k , ..., x
p∗
K
ª
be
the vector of optimal levels of provision of the goods for player p.
Of course, if D and R have the same preferences, their common “first-best”
allocation will result; when R is a perfect “agent” for D, the latter need not
concern itself with how to allocate its budget because in any which way it does
so, the very best outcome is realised. Indeed, as noted by Devarajan, Rajku-
mar, and Swaroop (1999: 1), “[T]he question of what aid ultimately finances is
interesting only if the preferences of the donor are diﬀerent from those of the
recipient”. This is also the most realistic scenario. To analyse it, I therefore
make
Assumption 1 (conflict of interest)
βR1
βD1
< ... <
βRk
βDk
< ... <
βRK
βDK
⇔ σ
R
1
σD1
< ... <
σRk
σDk
< ... <
σRK
σDK
.
Thus, the goods can be ranked in increasing order in terms of the importance
R put on them relative to D. Moreover, this ranking is assumed to be strict.
7See e.g. Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) and Pack and Pack (1990, 1993).
8Hence, in order to focus on the results of the strategic interaction between D and R I
disregard well-known phenomena such as the Dutch Disease inflicted by inflows of foreign
economic assistance.
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This does not preclude the existence of some k for which σDk = σ
R
k , but it does
rule out there being more than one such good.9
I will analyse three diﬀerent orders of the timing of moves: D as the Stackelberg-
leader (denoted by superscript L), D as the follower (F ), and simultaneous
moves (N). Much of the traditional aid literature has, at least implicitly, as-
sumed that D is the leader. Conditionality - attaching conditions to the aid
transfers - has been a strategy much used by donors in the last couple of decades.
One way of viewing conditionality is that donors dictate the terms of the aid
relationship.10 This may be modelled as D having a first-mover advantage in
its interaction with the recipient. Most empirical studies conclude, however,
that at best conditionality has had a limited impact. Conditions are never fully
implemented as specified. Furthermore, at least for altruistic donors, it would
be diﬃcult to avoid dynamic inconsistency. If unmet needs are detected in re-
cipient countries, altrustic donors would have a hard time ignoring these even if
they are due to the governments of these countries not having implemented con-
ditions previously agreed upon. Therefore, in the literature on the Samaritan’s
Dilemma (see e.g. Pedersen 1997, 2001 and Svensson 2000), it is assumed that
donors are followers. To highlight the diﬀerences in outcomes that result, it is
common in these works to contrast the cases of donor and recipient leadership.
I will do so too. The case of simultaneous moves, where neither party has a
first-mover advantage, provides a useful starting point for understanding the
basic mechanisms. To keep the exposition as simple as possible while illustrat-
ing all aspects of the games, I focus on the case K = 3 in the main text. The
formal presentation of the results for any K ≥ 2 and the proofs can be found
in appendix A. The special case of K = 2 is briefly discussed at the end of this
section.
2.2 Simultaneous Moves
In a simultaneous-move game, we are looking for a Nash-equilibrium in which
both R andD allocate their budgets optimally given the funding strategy chosen
by the other party. The donor will, if possible, choose its aid policy so that
the end result is that the consumption of any xk ∈ X is xD∗k . Equating the
expression for xD∗k with xk =
bDk +b
R
k
qk
, we get bDk = qkx
D∗
k − bRk = σDk B − bRk
at an interior solution. That is, as funds from the donor and the recipient are
perfect substitutes, the donor would like to add on to whatever the recipient
has allocated so that its optimal consumption of the two goods results. In the
remainder, I will denote these functions by bD∗k and refer to the set of them as the
“first-best” strategy of the donor. The corresponding strategy for the recipient
is bR∗k = σ
R
k B − bDk . For the sake of brevity, I will denote these strategies by
bD∗ and bR∗, whereas bD and bR are used as a general short-hand for the
budgetary strategies of the two players.
9The assumption is stricter than is needed, and is made in order to limit the number of
equilibrium regions to be characterised.
10As noted in the introduction, another is to view conditionality as reflecting a contract
between donors and recipients.
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Let us start by noting an important implication of assumption 1: namely
that, loosely speaking, at the optimal levels of provision for the other player
each player has a strict ranking of the marginal benefits from increasing the
supply of the various collective goods. Letting superscript −p refer to the other
player, e.g. if p = D, then −p = R. the statement just made may be expressed
more precisely in the following way:
Lemma 1
Suppose xl = x
−p∗
l and xm = x
−p∗
m , m > l. Then, holding b
−p constant,
∂Up
∂b
p
l
> ∂U
p
∂b
p
m
, p = D, and ∂U
p
∂b
p
l
< ∂U
p
∂b
p
m
, p = R.
For example, when the consumption vector isXR∗, forD the highest (lowest)
marginal benefit from spending a unit of its budget comes from allocating it to
x1 (xK). For R, it is the other way around at XD∗. However, the result is more
general; whenever the expenditure ratio of two goods is optimal according to the
preferences of the other player, a player’s relative marginal benefit of spending
on the goods in question is determined by the index number of the goods.
Another useful result is the following:
Lemma 2
Let eX ⊆ X. If for any xl, xm ∈ eX, ∂Up∂bpl = ∂Up∂bpm holding b−p constant, then
the optimal budgetary strategy of p is bpn = eσpn

Bp +
X
ν∈ eX
b−pν

− b−pn ∀n ∈ eX,
where eσpn = σpnX
ν∈fX
σ
p
ν
.
I will call this p’s second best strategy, denoted by bp∗∗. The important
feature of this strategy is that it preserves the first-best expenditure ratios
between the sub-set of goods financed by p: qlxl
qmxm
=
eσpleσpm = σ
p
l
σ
p
m
. This may
also be confirmed by noting that when eX = X, bp∗∗ = bp∗.
After these preliminaries, I first note some obvious results.
Result 1
All collective goods are provided in equilibrium.
This is simply due to the marginal utility of consumption of a goods going
to infinity if the good is not supplied. Hence, if one player does not contribute
to the provision of a good, the other player will. This result of course extends
to sequential games.
It should also be clear that as long as there is conflict over the allocation,
it can never be the case that
©
bDN ,bRN
ª
=
©
bD∗,bR∗
ª
. That is, as long
as σD1 6= σR1 , the first-best strategies of the players cannot constitute a Nash-
equilibrium strategy profile. The first-best strategies are constructed such that
if they are used by a player, the resulting allocation is the best possible partition
of the combined budget from its perspective. When these allocations diﬀer, it
is impossible to attain them simultaneously. Hence, we have
Result 2©
bD∗,bR∗
ª
cannot be a Nash-equilibrium.
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The main issue is therefore under what circumstances one of the players may
use its "first-best" strategy. Consider R first. To ask when bR∗ is feasible is
to ask for which parameter values bR∗k ∈
£
0, BR
¤
∀k. Denote the share of total
resources controlled by the donor by α = B
D
BD+BR . As will become apparent, in
the case of K = 3 there are four critical values of this parameter.
When α ≤ σR1 , D controls a share of total available resources that is smaller
than its optimal budget share for the good it has the strongest preference for
in relative terms, x1. The outcome is then XR∗. By lemma 1, at XR∗ ∂U
D
∂bD1
>
∂UD
∂bD2
> ∂U
D
∂bD3
. It is therefore optimal for D to choose bD1 = B
D. That is, it
will only fund the good it attaches the strongest relative priority to. Even
so, bR∗ is feasible. bR∗1 = σ
R
1 B − BD =
¡
σR1 − α
¢
B ≥ 0 and
P3
k=1 b
R∗
k =¡
σR1 − α
¢
B +
¡
1− σR1
¢
B = (1− α)B = BR.
When R cannot overfund x3 according to D’s preferences even if it devotes
its entire budget to this good, it is D that enjoys the best of all possible worlds.
More precisely, this is the case when 1 − α ≤ σD3 ⇔ α ≥ 1 − σD3 . Hence,
XN = XD∗ and by lemma 2 it will indeed be optimal for R to spend only on
x3. Yet still bD∗3 ≥ 0 and so R is without influence on the final outcome.
For α ∈
£
σR1 , 1− σD3
¤
, matters are slightly more complex.11 Consider first
values of α slightly higher than σR1 . If D chooses b
D
1 = B
D, bR∗1 is not fea-
sible. That is, the budgetary share of x1 would be sub-optimally high from
R’s perspective. The recipient therefore spends its resources on the other two
goods according to bR∗∗2 and b
R∗∗
3 , c.f. Lemma 2. On the other hand, D still
thinks good 1 is underfunded. It therefore optimally sticks to the "extreme"
strategy
©
BD, 0, 0
ª
. The outcome is then XN =
n
BD,
eσR2 BR
q2
,
eσR3 BR
q3
o
, where
eσR2 = σR2σR2 +σR3 and eσR3 = σR3σR2 +σR3 .
If one makes the thought experiment of increasing α from σR1 , the equilibrium
level of x1 will increase and those of x2 and x3 will decrease. Hence,D’s marginal
benefit of spending on good 1 drops, while the marginal benefits of spending
on the other two goods rises. For high enough values of α it will eventually be
the case that given R’s strategy D will find it optimal to spend on the other
goods. Lemma 1 demonstrates that this will first be the case for good 2. The
next critical value of D’s share of total available resources is therefore where
∂UD
∂bD1
= ∂U
D
∂bD2
, given the strategies
©
BD, 0, 0
ª
and
©
0, bR∗∗2 , b
R∗∗
3
ª
. For values
of α above this cut-oﬀ rate, x2 will be jointly funded by the players. The
equilibrium in this region therefore has a kind of knife-edge property: a unit
increase in α will result in D raising its spending on this good to the same extent
while R will be lowering its contribution by one unit. The supply of all goods
is therefore constant. This is the only way that one can simultaneously have
x1
q2x2
=
σD1
σD2
and q2x2
q3x3
=
σR2
σR3
. In sum, equilibrium strategies and outcomes in this
region are
11Using assumption 1 and
KX
k=1
σpk = 1, p = D,R, one can show that 1− σ
D
3 > σR1 .
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bDN =
©
bD∗∗1 , b
D∗∗
2 , 0
ª
=
neσD1 α3B, (α− α2)B, 0o ;
bRN =
©
0, bR∗∗2 , b
R∗∗
3
ª
=
n
0, (α3 − α)B, eσR3 (1− α2)Bo ;
XN =
(eσD1 α3B, (α3 − α2)Bq2 , eσ
R
3 (1− α2)B
q3
)
.
α2 and α3 are the critical values separating this region from region 2, dis-
cussed above, and region 4, which is a mirror image of that region in which D
funds goods 1 and 2 whereas R spends on x3 only. Hence α3 is the value of α
where bR∗∗2 drops to zero, given D’s strategy
©
bD∗∗1 , b
D∗∗
2 , 0
ª
. R then controls
such a low share of B that it is optimal for it to spend its whole budget on
the good for which it has the strongest relative preference in order to keep the
equilibrium share of spending on this good as high as possible. It enjoys some
success with this strategy until α reaches α4 = 1 − σD3 ; as we have seen, for
values of α higher than this D dominates so in terms of relative resources that
it is in total control over the outcome.
[Table 1 about here]
The results for this case are illustrated in table 1 and summarised in propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1
In a simultaneous-move game of budgetary allocations between an aid donor
and a recipient with conflicting interests as described by assumption 1, outcomes
only depend on the share of the total available resources controlled by D when
budgets are exogenous. If the number of collective goods is at least three,
there are three diﬀerent types of equilibria where: i) one of the players is at a
corner solution, funding only the good that is most severely underfunded from
its perspective, while the other player spends on all goods, thereby controlling
the final outcome; ii) each good is financed by only one player, where, if a player
funds more than one good, the ratios in which goods are supplied are first-best
optimal according to the player providing them; iii) one good is jointly funded
even though both players allocates resources to more than one good; in this case
the supply of all goods are constant.
What are the eﬀects on the equilibrium budgetary shares of the three goods
as the share of total available resources controlled by the donor increase? Let
ηNk (α) be the Nash-equilibrium budgetary share of good k as a function of α,
i.e., ηNk (α) =
qkxk
B
. Given the fact that a higher value of α means greater
spending power for the donor and smaller for the recipient, it should not be
surprising that in the case of K = 3 ηN1 (α) is a weakly monotonically increasing
function of the share of B controlled byD while ηN3 (α) is a weakly monotonically
decreasing function of α. This is illustrated in figures 1a and 1c. The figures
also demonstrate that ηN1 (α) ∈
£
σR1 , σ
D
1
¤
and ηN3 (α) ∈
£
σD3 , σ
R
3
¤
. That is, the
equilibrium spending shares of the two players’ favourite good always take on
values in the closed interval having their respective optimal budgetary shares
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as end points. However, this is the case for good 2. Figure 1b shows that
not only is ηN2 (α) a non-monotonic function; there are regions where η
N
2 (α) <
Min
©
σD2 , σ
R
2
ª
.12 Not being on top of either player’s list of priority thus results
in spending on good 2 losing out in the battle over resource allocation between R
andD to the extent that both players would ideally like to raise the consumption
of this collective good. Yet given the budgetary strategy of the other player,
none of them has the incentive to do so, as this would mean sacrificing some of
the output of their priority goods.
[Figure 1a about here]
[Figure 1b about here]
[Figure 1c about here]
2.3 Sequential Moves
In games concerning economic policy, it is usually an advantage to move first,
i.e., to commit to a strategy before one’s opponent make its decision. ForK ≥ 3,
this is the case in the current setting too. On the other hand, for K = 2,
outcomes are independent of the order of moves. This interesting special case
is explored at the end of this section. First, however, I return to the example
of K = 3 and show that the change from the simultaneous move game is that
there are no interior equilibria with joint financing of a good. The first-mover
advantage is thus that one can take the response of the other player into account
when evaluating the costs and benefits of spending on a good.
Suppose that D chooses its budgetary strategy before R. In the last stage,
the recipient will try to reach XR∗. That is, if at all possible, it will use the
strategy bR∗. This means that if the donor is to move the final allocation away
from XR∗, it has to ensure that the solution to the recipient’s problem is not
in the interior of the choice set. In other words, it must make at least one of
the non-negativity constraints on R’s budgetary policy binding. It should be
readily apparent that this is not feasible if α ≤ σR1 . Even if D concentrates its
resources on increasing the budgetary share of x1, bR∗1 ≥ 0. Thus, for such
parameter values XL = XN = XR∗. Also note that αL1 = α
N
1 = σ
R
1 . The
only slight change from the last sub-section is that the strategy of the leader,
in this case D, is not unique when it cannot influence the end result in the
desired direction. Any allocation of its budget that results in XR∗ being the
outcome is as good as any other. In the event that D could make one of the
other non-negativity constraints on R’s budgetary strategy binding, this would
only result in x1 being even lower than xR∗1 , a result that is clearly not desirable
for the donor. This means that when its financial muscles are weak, the donor
must accept the fact that the recipient government is in complete control over
the allocation.
Outcomes in region 2 are also the same as in the simultaneous move game.
If D sets bD1 = B
D, R will not spend on good 1. Instead it divides its budget
optimally between x2 and x3. However, now this type of equilibrium exists until
12The figure is drawn for σD2 < σR2 . If σD2 > σR2 , the point would be even clearer.
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α = αN3 . The reason is that the marginal benefit of spending is lower for D when
it takes R’s reaction into account. Since R plays
©
0, bR∗∗2 , b
R∗∗
3
ª
if bD1 = B
D
for α ∈
£
αN2 , α
N
3
¤
, reallocating a unit of funds from x1 to, say, x2 yields the
following change in D’s objective function
∆UD = −∂U
D
∂x1
+
∂UD
∂x2
1
q2
µ
1 +
∂bR∗∗2
∂bD2
¶
+
∂UD
∂x3
1
q3
∂bR∗∗3
∂bD2
< 0.
That is, as long as R is at an interior solution with respect to spending on
x2 and x3, it will adjust its budgetary allocation to preserve the expenditure
ratio eσR2eσR3 = σ
R
2
σR3
for these two goods. This means that ∂b
R∗∗
2
∂bD2
= −
³
1− eσR2 ´ and
∂bR∗∗3
∂bD2
= eσR3 . In this region D could replicate the Nash-equilibrium outcome by
choosing its Nash-equilibrium strategy. R’s response would then be the same
as in the simultaneous move game since as a follower it takes bD as given when
deciding on its best choice. However, D can do better by leaving the supply of
good 2 to the recipient. Then, by Lemma 1, ∂U
D
∂x2
1
q2
> ∂U
D
∂x3
1
q3
. Since eσR2 +eσR3 = 1
the sum of last two terms on the left-hand side of the inequality is therefore
less than ∂U
D
∂x2
1
q2
. Moreover, at αN3 R’s best response to b
D =
©
bD∗∗1 , b
D∗∗
2 , 0
ª
will be bR =
©
0, 0, bR∗∗3
ª
. This will generate the Nash-equilibrium outcome
and we know that at this point a marginal reallocation of the kind studied
here yields ∆UD = −∂UD
∂x1
+ ∂U
D
∂x2
1
q2
= 0. But for α ∈
¡
αN2 , α
N
3
¢
, ∆UD =
−∂UD
∂x1
+ ∂U
D
∂x2
1
q2
eσR2 + ∂UD∂x3 1q3 eσR3 < 0. Hence, in the sub-game perfect equilibrium
it is optimal for D to only spend on its favourite good. D will not commence
financing x2 until it can make sure that x1q2x2 =
σD1
σD2
, which it realises is not
feasible until α > α3 due to the response of R. Only if there is no crowding-out
of R’s contribution will D finance both x1 and x2 when it is the leader in a
sequential game.
Joint financing of goods therefore only results for parameter values such that
one of the players is without influence over the final allocation. Since good 2
is not on the top of either player’s list of priorities, it is never jointly financed.
With respect to good 3, joint financing is the outcome for α > 1−σD3 , as was the
case in the simultaneous move game. Then D correctly anticipates that R will
choose
©
0, 0, BR
ª
in response to
©
σD1 B, σ
D
2 B,σ
D
3 B −BR
ª
and the outcome is
thus XD∗.
When the donor is a follower, the situation is turned on its head: the recipient
will then leave the funding of good 2 entirely in the hands ofD for α ∈
£
αN2 , α
N
3
¤
.
R will realise that a small contribution by it towards financing the supply of x2
will be reallocated to suit D’s tastes. It will therefore not fund this good until it
is certain thatD will not do so; only then is the expenditure ratio between goods
1 and 2 right from R’s perspective, justifying diverting some of its budget away
from its favourite good to increase the supply of x2. Proposition 2 summarises
these results:
Proposition 2
In a sequential game of budgetary allocations between an aid donor and a
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recipient with conflicting interests as described by assumption 1, there are two
kinds of equilibria in which: i) one of the players is at a corner solution, funding
only its favourite good, while the other player spends on all goods, thereby
controlling the final outcome; or ii) each good is financed by only one player
and the ratios in which goods are supplied are first-best optimal according to
the player providing them if at least two goods are funded by it.
Interestingly, the equilibrium budgetary shares for x1 and x3 are no longer
monotonic functions of α. In fact, neither these nor ηN2 (α) are even continuous
functions in sequential games. There is a jump in all equilibrium budgetary
share functions at α = αN3 due to the leader taking over the responsibility of
financing x2 from the follower. Figures 2a-c illustrates this for the case when
D is the leader.13 This means that small changes in α around such a critical
value could cause large changes in the provision of collective goods, something
that might surprise observers disregarding the fact that donors and recipients
interact strategically.
[Figure 2a about here]
[Figure 2b about here]
[Figure 2c about here]
From the above, it also follows that there are parameter values for which each
player has a strict ranking over the order of moves, as well as values of for which
they are indiﬀerent to the type of game being played because outcomes are the
same. For α < αN2 and α > α
N
3 X
F = XL = XN , and so players do not care
about the order in which they choose budgetary strategies. However, for α ∈£
αN2 , α
N
3
¤
both players prefer being a leader to playing the simultaneous-move
game, with being a follower the least attractive option. It is straightforward
to establish that for such parameter values xL1 − xN1 ≥ 0 ≥ xF1 − xN1 and
xF3 − xN3 ≥ 0 ≥ xL3 − xN3 , whereas there is a higher level of x2 in the Nash-
equilibrium compared to the equilibria of both sequential games. Since none of
the players consider any equilibrium outcome first-best optimal in this range,
they obviously prefer a higher level of supply of their favourite good and reduced
output of the other player’s priority good, a result they can achieve if they are
the leader. Lowering x2 does not totally negate this gain because the higher
spending on x1 or x3, as the case may be, is partially compensated by the
follower spending less on its favourite good and somewhat more on x2 than
in the Nash-equilibrium. Analytically, if we let Bgk be the equilibrium level of
spending on good k in game g, we may exemplify the gain to, say, D from
moving from Nash to Stackelberg-leadership as follows
∆UD = ∂U
D
∂x1
¡
BL1 −BN1
¢
+
∂UD
∂x2
1
q2
¡
BL2 −BN2
¢
+
∂UD
∂x3
1
q3
¡
BL3 −BN3
¢
> 0.
Because D finances both x1 and x2 but not x3 in the Nash-equilibrium
we are concerned with, ∂U
D
∂x1
= ∂U
D
∂x2
1
q2
> ∂U
D
∂x3
1
q3
. Moreover, BL1 − BN1 =
13The exact location of the functions depend on parameter values, but the jumps are in the
direction shown.
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−
£¡
BL2 −BN2
¢
+
¡
BL3 −BN3
¢¤
. That is, we may rewrite the change as ∆UD =
−
³
∂UD
∂x1
− ∂UD
∂x3
1
q3
´ ¡
BL3 −BN3
¢
, which is positive due to the lower spending on
x3 in the sub-game perfect equilibrium when D is the leader. A corresponding
exercise could be performed to show that the higher spending on x3 more than
compensates R for the reduction in spending on the other goods that results
from assuming leadership in the budgetary game. So for K ≥ 3 we have
Proposition 3
For some values of the share of the combined budget controlled by D players
are indiﬀerent to the order of moves because outcomes are the same in the
Nash-equilibrium and the sub-game perfect equilibria. There are also parameter
values such that each player at least weakly prefers being a leader to playing
Nash, with being the follower yielding the worst outcomes according to their
preferences.
I will now show that Proposition 3 does not apply when K = 2.
2.4 The Special Case of K = 2
With only two goods assumption 1 reduces to σ
R
1
σD1
<
σR2
σD2
=
1−σR1
1−σD1
⇔ σD1 > σR1 .
So R controls the outcome of a simultaneous move game for α ≤ σR1 and D
for σD2 = 1 − σD1 ≥ 1 − α ⇔ α ≥ σD1 . Since there are only priority goods,
there are no "interior" equilibria with joint financing of a good. Joint financing
of a good only occurs when one of the players is at a corner solution, trying
in vain to increase the share of the combined budget being devoted to the
good for which it has a stronger relative preference than the other player. For
α ∈
£
σR1 , σ
D
1
¤
, both players choose extreme strategies, each spending solely on
its favourite good, the result being that the outcome lies between XD∗ and
XR∗, c.f. ηN1 (α) = α. Switching to a sequential game does not change this
fact. Recall from the discussion of K = 3 that the only change precipitated by
such a switch occurred for values of α where there was joint financing of the
non-priority good x2 in the Nash-equilibrium. As already noted, in the current
case there is no such region. Intuitively, for α ∈
£
σR1 , σ
D
1
¤
D will, if it is the
leader, realise that any funds not spent on x1 by it will be used by R to raise
the level of provision of x2. This is clearly not in D’s interest as it would ideally
like to have the budgetary share of the former good at σD1 > α. Only when
α ≥ σD1 can D "leave money on the table", safe in the knowledge that R will
spend its whole budget on x2. So outcomes follow the pattern established for
the simultaneous move game. This is surprising prima facie; as noted above,
it is usually an advantage to move first in games of economic policy. Yet the
underlying logic of this particular game is that there is a strict conflict over how
to split the pie. If possible, each of them will therefore unilaterally make sure
that their favourite good is optimally supplied. With only two goods, such an
achievement also implies that spending on the other good is optimal according
to the preferences of the player in this advantageous position. However, given
the resource constraints at most one of them can be in such a position. When
none of them has the power to unilaterally achieve optimal spending levels from
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their perspective, both D and R try to exploit the incomplete control of the
other party over the pie to increase the share allocated to the good they attach
the greatest priority to relative to the other player. Since their preferences
are strictly opposed, each of them are drawn to extreme positions, spending
all of their budget on the good they deem to be undersupplied. Changing the
order of moves therefore does not make a diﬀerence: either one of the players
control a large enough share of the available resources to bring about its first-
best allocation or the equilibrium is a stalemate where each uses its budget to
ensure that the outcome is as close to this point as possible. Hence, there is
no first-mover advantage. It follows that the two possible types of sequential
games are mirror-images of each other. The fact that the logic extends to the
case where R moves before D means that equilibrium outcomes are completely
isomorphic to the order of moves:
Proposition 4
In a budgetary game with conflict over the provision of two public goods as
described by assumption 1, outcomes does not depend on the order in which
the players move. There are three regions with diﬀerent equilibria, two of which
entails complete control over the outcome by one of the players and one in
which each player devotes their budgets to their priority good, and the kind of
equilibrium realised depends only on the share of the combined budgets of the
players controlled by the donor.
Hence, if one thinks it suﬃces to aggregate goods into two composites, those
that the donor care more strongly for than the recipient and those for which
the opposite ranking applies, the model here has the empirical implication that
outcomes should not depend on changes in the relative commitment capacity
of the players. Whether or not the donor or the recipient is best at tying their
hands, it is the amount of resources they are willing to put into the game that
matters. If a greater share comes out of the pockets of the donor, one is more
likely to observe outcomes that conform to the preferences of the donor and vice
versa.
[Figure 3 about here]
With only two goods, it is easier to demonstrate graphically how equilibrium
outcomes map out when the comparative statics exercise is in terms of the
level of the aid budget, keeping B fixed, so that higher levels of α also means
higher levels of the combined budget of the two players. Figure 3 illustrates this
situation. Since the objective functions are homothetic, optimal budget shares
stay constant as B increases. Hence, instead of studying how the equilibrium
changes as α varies for fixed B, the same pattern of outcomes results when BD
is varied holding BR constant. Note how the bold line marking equilibrium
allocations first (i.e., for BD ≤ BD =
³
σR1
1−σR1
´
BR) follow the expansion path
of R. When D starts to have influence, outcomes begin to deviate from this
path, moving closer to the donor’s expansion path as BD increases. When
BD > B
D
=
³
σD1
1−σD1
´
BR, the donor is in complete control, so outcomes move
out along its expansion path as the total amount of available resources goes up
with BD.
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A final point is the fact that the recipient is always better oﬀ playing the aid
game. Note that the outcomes always lie northeast of R’s optimal allocation
when the donor does not transfer any funds. As R’s preferences can be repre-
sented by indiﬀerence curves of the standard type, these outcomes generate a
higher value of the recipient’s objective function. The reason is simply that at
low levels of aid, where one could suspect that the transfer could be inadequate
to compensate for any “distortion” in outcomes due to donor influence, D has
in fact no leverage. And when D provides resources at a level suﬃcient to have
an impact on outcomes, R is more than compensated by the increase in the
budget available for spending on goods 1 and 2.
3 The Issue of Fungibility
It is diﬃcult to define fungibility in a precise way. The definition adopted here
corresponds to that of Pedersen (1997), who characterises aid as fungible if it
is possible for the recipient to divert resources away from the activity that the
donor seeks to finance. As pointed out by him, the possibility of diversion is
but a necessary condition for actual diversion; in order to divert funds, the the
recipient must also wish to do so. Hence, to explore the importance of diversion,
we must investigate how the funding strategies of the recipient and the donor
depend on their preferences, their budgets, and the nature of their strategic
interaction.
In the literature, the example that is ordinarily used to illustrate the con-
cept is a situation where a donor wants to support a specific activity in the
recipient country through an earmarked grant. Aid is then said to be fungible
if expenditures on that activity do not rise by the full amount of the grant.
Figure 4, adapted from Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998), is an example of
this standard approach.14
In Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998), the donor is assumed not to care
about the good or activity x2. It only wants to support x1. It does so by
donating an amount equal to the distance between points E and B. That is,
subject to a restriction to be discussed shortly, the budget line of the recipient
is moved out to the extent of the aid given. The donor wants the resulting
allocation to be at point F . At that point, x1 has increased relative to the
original allocation by an amount F − C, which is equal to E − B. Aid is then
said to be partially fungible if the recipient can divert part of the grant for x1
to x2. It is said to be completely fungible if “the post-aid optimal mix of the
two goods, chosen by the country, is an interior solution” (p. 31).
[Figure 4 about here]
Even in this apparantly simple setting, however, there are some loose ends.
These authors assume that the recipient must spend at least the size of the grant
14A similar illustration appears in Devarajan and Swaroop (2000). Note that Feyzioglu,
Swaroop, and Zhu (1998: 33) themselves seem to regard the framework they adopt as less
than ideal; they explicitly state that “[w]e take [...] fungibility [...] as given, rather than
deriving it from a game-theoretic framework.”
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on the activity supported by the donor. That is, we must have x1 ≥ E − B,
so that the new budget constraint has a kink. In figure 4 this occurs at point
D, and the assumption of Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) means that
points between H and D are not accessible to the recipient. This assumption
is analogous to the non-negativity constraints that I impose on the recipient’s
funding choices. The motivation, however, seems to be diﬀerent; the authors
state that the kink indicates aid conditionality, so presumably they believe that
the donor will “punish” the recipient if it spends less than this amount. But
then why does not the donor punish the recipient if it diverts part of the grant to
other activities? Given the problem of punishing straying recipients, as reflected
in the generally unimpressing record of conditionality, there is an untold story
here that needs elaboration.
A second point to note is that, as long as the objective function of the
recipient is homothetic and both goods are normal, it is easy to demonstrate
that the assumption x1 ≥ E − B implies that if the grant is “very large”, full
fungibility is not possible. Moving the point D far enough to the right in figure
3, it will eventually be the case that the expansion path of the recipient lies to
the northwest of D. Hence, in this setting as well there is a link between grant
size and final allocations, but it is not explored.
A third point is that even if one accepts that the donor only cares about
one good (or set of goods), while the recipient wants to spend on some goods
not given priority at all by the donor, the latter can always adjust the level of
funding. That is, if aid is to some extent fungible, this should be reflected in the
size of the grant. The observation just made, namely that under the assumption
x1 ≥ E−B full fungibility is impossible if the grant is large enough, makes clear
the need to investigate donor and recipient behaviour simultaneously.
In sum, implicit in the standard, non-strategic approach is a naive represen-
tation of the donor, particularly if fungibility is indeed an important problem.
In the present model, the donor acts strategically, taking into account the pos-
sibility of diversion of resources by the recipient. Therefore, it optimally adjusts
its aid policy in order to achieve as much as possible. Yet, as the recipient is
equally adept at playing the game, the donor’s achievements is determined by
relative spending power. There is full fungibility if the donor brings only small
change to the table, no fungibility if its pockets are suﬃciently deep, and partial
fungibility in between. One should therefore expect the impact of foreign eco-
nomic assistance to vary across time and space with the ratio of aid to recipient
government budgets. This general conclusion accords well with existing empir-
ical literature, which indeed indicates that the degree to which aid is fungible
varies across countries and periods. For example, with respect to Indonesia dur-
ing 1966-86 Pack and Pack (1990: 193) conclude that “most categorical aid was
spent on the purposes for which it was intended by the donors.” However, when
investigating the same issue in the Dominican Republic for almost the same time
period, they report that “[i]n no case does the increase in expenditure nearly
equal the increase in categorical aid, indicating substantial diversion away from
the intended expenditure patterns” (Pack and Pack 1993: 263).
15
4 Endogenous Budgets for Collective Goods
Assuming fixed budgets for both the donor and the recipient is a useful bench-
mark. Tax systems in many developing countries are highly rudimentary and
tax administration is notoriously lax, with corruption, tax avoidance, and tax
evasion constituting very real constraints on the government’s ability to raise
revenues. Improving tax capacity takes time. Moreover, many aid recipients,
particularly in Africa, lack access to alternative external sources of funds. This
is not likely to change over night.
On the donor side, it is noteworthy that aid allocation patterns across coun-
tries show a relatively high degree of persistence. One reason for this, is that
some donors have favourite recipients, for example due to historical or cultural
ties.15 Even bilateral donors that tend to give aid to the poorest countries often
designate some recipients as the main targets for their development assistance.
One argument for building long-term relationships is of course that it facilitates
the accumulation of country-specific knowledge, which potentially could lead
to greater aid eﬃciency. Thus, over a medium-term horizon, assuming given
budget levels for both players is a reasonable approximation to reality.
Still, it is obviously of interest to see whether the results derived so far
hold up when budgets are endogenous, especially if the call for aid selectivity is
heeded by donors. In this section I show that the same three kinds of equilibria -
complete control over the outcome for either player or shared influence - arise in
this case in essentially the same way. Specifically, the degree of influence again
varies with the share of total available resources controlled by D and the critical
values depend on the order of moves. It turns out that even though the donor
controls the outcome at a higher relative cost when it is a Stackelberg-follower
instead of a leader, it is always better oﬀ having the first move. In fact, for the
same parameter values being a leader always yields at least as high a pay-oﬀ as
in the Nash-equilibrium, with the latter in turn is everywhere at least as good
as the equilibrium outcome when the donor is a follower in a sequential game.
R too, ranks games in this way based on equilibrium outcomes; that is, it would
always at least weakly prefer being a leader to playing a simultaneous move
game, which in turn is at least weakly preferred to moving last in a sequential
game. The reason is that a leader can calculate whether it would be optimal to
try to impose its most preferred allocation. If the improvement in the outcome
does not generate a benefit at least commensurate with the cost, the leader can
always leave provision of one or both goods to the follower. The latter does not
have the option of making such a calculation, and therefore cannot be better oﬀ
than if it were. The simultaneous move game naturally leads to an intermediate
constellation of critical parameter values.
In this section then, the preferences of the players are
W p (X, zp) = U
p (X) + βpp
z1−µp
1− µ, p = D,R. (5)
15See for example Alesina and Dollar (2000), Boone (1996), Boschini and Olofsgård (2003),
Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1997), and Chauvet (2002).
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Thus, zp is a private good that only player p cares for.16 For example, it
might be private consumption in the country in question.17 As before,
X
k
b
p
k =
Bp, but now BD and BR are determined endogenously taking into account that
funding collective goods is costly as it leads to lower levels of consumption of
the private good. Assuming convex marginal costs of contributing to the supply
of goods in X is most realistic for R, given the dependence of poor countries
on highly distortionary instruments such as trade taxes for a large part of their
public revenues. For the donor, constant marginal costs would probably be a
better approximation to reality, because most donors are not even fulfilling the
UN target of giving at least 0.7% of their GNI in the aggregate.18 Thus, the
total aid budget for a particular recipient is quite small for all donors, and so is
unlikely to aﬀect the marginal cost of public funds. In Hagen (2002) I analysed
the case of constant costs for both players. I therefore concentrate on the more
general case here.
Each player now spends out of an endowment of Y p. Let Y = Y D + Y R.
It is straightforward to derive the “first-best” levels of supply for the players in
the current context. They are19
xD∗k =
σDk Y
qk
,∀k, zD∗D =
σDDY
qD
, zD∗R = 0; (6a)
xR∗k =
σRk Y
qk
,∀k, zR∗D = 0, zR∗R =
σRRY
qR
. (6b)
The analogy to the case where total spending by each player on the collective
goods is exogenous should be clear. In particular, optimal expenditure shares are
of the same form for both collective goods and the private one. One important
change, though, is that these allocations are unattainable. Since the marginal
benefit from spending on a good goes to infinity as consumption goes to zero, all
goods will be supplied in all equilibria. As long as Y p > 0, each player will make
sure that zp > 0 even though the other player would prefer that no resources
are spent on this good.
The “first-best” budgetary strategies may be derived from (6a− b) as well
as the fact that consumption of any good is just the total amount of funds
contributed by D and R divided by the price of the good. Denoting spending
by p on the two private goods by cpD and c
p
R, they may be expressed as
16Note that I now assume
KX
k=1
βpk + β
p
p = 1, p = D,R.
17Potential alternatives are consumption (public and/or private) in other recipient countries
for the donor and goods that only the elite in the recipient country benefits from.
18Only the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are currently achiev-
ing this target.
19 I adopt the notational convention that subscripts D and R refer to zD and zR, respectively.
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bD∗k = σ
D
k Y − bRk ,∀k, cDD = σDDY − cRD, cDR = 0; (7a)
bR∗k = σ
R
k Y − bDk ,∀k, cRD = 0, cRR = σRRY − cDR . (7b)
The basic assumption of the character of the conflict of interest between R
and D is retained. I therefore still assume that K ≥ 2, otherwise assumption
1 would turn into an assumption about strongest relative preference for private
versus collective goods. The simplest case illustrating all the results, which I
focus on in the main text, is now K = 2. I once again start with a description
of the Nash-equilibrium. It turns out to be a straightforward extension of the
case analysed in section 2.
Let γ = Y D/Y be the share of total available resources controlled by D.
When γ is very high, R will not contribute towards the provision of the collective
goods because its consumption of zR will then be too low from its perspective.
The highest critical value, denoted by γN3 , is thus found by solving
∂WR
∂bR2
= ∂W
R
∂cRR
given D’s first-best budgetary strategy as well as cRR = Y
R. For γ > γN3 ,
∂WR
∂cRR
> ∂W
R
∂bR2
, and assumption 1 ensures that ∂W
R
∂bR2
is higher than the marginal
benefit from spending on x1. However, for values of γ lower than γN3 , it is
optimal for R to contribute to the provision of x2. For γ ∈
£
γN2 , γ
N
3
¢
, the
equilibria entail joint funding of x2 in the manner described in section 2. For
still lower values of the share of total available resources controlled by D, there
is first a region where each player funds one collective good only, then a region
with joint funding of x1. The final region is the mirror image of the one where
R only finances zR: D only spends on zD, leaving the supply of both collective
goods to the recipient.
Thus the only real change is that there are parameter values such that only
one player finances X. This is the case when the other player’s endowment is so
low that it is better oﬀ spending it all on its private good, which it must provide
on its own. For intermediate values of γ, equilibria switches between regions
where each xk is supplied by only one player to regions of joint funding of a
single collective good, with R assuming more and D less of the responsibility for
providing X as γ goes down, in the sense that each switch implies that either
D stops funding a collective good or R starts to finance one.
Changing the order of moves also makes a diﬀerence when BD and BR are
endogenous. When one player moves before the other, there are no equilibria
with joint funding of a collective good. Intuitively, for the parameter values
where it was optimal for the leader to provide funds for xk in the simultaneous
move game even though the follower also contributed, the former is better oﬀ
by leaving the task to the latter since this means less spending on the follower’s
private good. We know that whenever the follower finances two or more goods,
the ratio in which any two goods are supplied are equal to the ratio of the
"first-best" budgetary shares. Hence, if the leader withdraws funding for xk,
the follower reduces its spending on all other goods to which it contributes
to compensate for this. Accordingly, the amount of resources allocated to the
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private good of the follower is reduced, and the leader may use some of the
savings to increase the level of consumption of its private good. Therefore,
in sequential games all critical values of γ marks a switch in the identity of a
provider of one of the collective goods, and any xk ∈ X is always funded by
only one player. Table 2 shows how this maps out for K = 2:
[Table 2 about here]
Proposition 5
When the amount of spending by the players on the collective goods is en-
dogenous, there are three types of equilibria: i) if a player controls a suﬃciently
low share of the combined resources of the players, it only funds its private good,
leaving the provision of the collective goods to the other player; ii) when each
collective good is funded by only one player, the expenditure ratios of the goods
provided by that player (including its private good) are first-best optimal from
its perspective; iii) in the simultaneous move game, there are parameter values
generating equilibria where both players jointly finance the provision of a col-
lective good. For these levels of the share of total available resources controlled
by the donor the leader in a sequential game prefers to have the follower fund
the good that is jointly provided in the Nash-equilibrium.
Given the similarities between this case and the case where each player
had a fixed total budget to spend on the collective goods, it should not be
surprising that the results with respect to equilibrium budgetary shares and
preferences over the order of moves are quite similar. The equilibrium budgetary
shares of the collective goods are in this case never monotonic functions of
the share of total available resources controlled by the donor. In fact, in the
sequential versions of the game they are not even contunuous functions of γ.
There are parameter values such that equilibrium outcomes are the same in all
three games, but where outcomes diﬀer players prefer being a leader to playing
Nash, with the latter judged to be better than being a follower.
5 Final remarks
The current version of this paper represents a first attempt to understand the
impact of aid on allocation patterns in recipient countries taking into account
the fact that whenever spending priorities diﬀer, donors and recipients play a
game in which each party tries to use the resources available to it to make sure
that the outcome is as good as possible from its perspective. Using a simple
framework, I have analysed how the end result of the interaction between a
donor and a recipient depends on the preferences and budgets of the players, as
well as the order in which they move. Despite the bare-bones approach, some
interesting results were derived:
• Fungibility, or influence over outcomes, is a function of relative resource
levels. If a player dominates the other player suﬃciently in this respect, the
equilibrium allocation is first-best according to this player’s preferences.
Hence, aid will not be fungible if the transfers are large enough compared
to the resources at the recipient’s command.
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• For some values of the share of total available resources controlled by the
donor, there is a first-mover advantage. For other parameter values as well
as the special case of only two collective goods and exogenous budgets,
equilibrium outcomes are independent of the order in which players move.
• The equilibrium budgetary shares of non-priority goods may be below
both players’ first-best level.
• In sequential games, equilibrium budgetary shares are discontinuous in the
share of the combined budget controlled by the donor. Thus, small changes
in this share may lead to large changes in the provision of collective goods.
The main conclusion of this paper, that influence over outcomes is a weakly
monotonically increasing function of relative budgets, might be construed as
supporting the current emphasis on aid selectivity in the donor community: if
greater selectivity is applied for given total aid budgets, some countries must
be receiving higher levels of aid. However, the results in Hagen (2003) suggest
that selective strategies could backfire by changing the political equilibrium in
the recipient countries. That is, if donors have influence, they will necessarily
aﬀect the outcome of elections in democratic recipient countries and the change
will always be in the direction of reducing the chances of having a government
with preferences closer aligned with the donor. Hence, choosing optimal aid
strategies from the point of view of the donors require a political economy
approach integrating the economics and politics of foreign economic assistance
in a setting of strategic interaction.
6 Appendix A: Exogenous Budgets
Proof of Lemma 1
Holding b−p constant, ∂U
p
∂b
p
k
= ∂U
p
∂xk
1
qk
. Suppose xl = x
−p∗
l and xm = x
−p∗
m .
Then ∂U
p
∂b
p
l
T ∂Up
∂b
p
m
⇔ σ
p
l
σ
−p
l
T σ
p
m
σ
−p
m
. By assumption 1, σ
R
l
σDl
<
σRm
σDm
, m > l. Hence
∂UD
∂bDl
> ∂U
D
∂bDm
and ∂U
R
∂bRl
< ∂U
R
∂bRm
. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let eK be the number of goods in eX. Then lemma 2 follows from solving
for optimal budgetary allocations from eK − 1 equalities of marginal benefits of
spending and the budget constraint of p. QED.
Let EDg = {1, ..., δ, ...,∆} and ERg = {P, ..., ρ, ...,K} be the sets of goods
financed by D and R, respectively in the equilibrium of a game of type g, g =
N,F,L. Whenever D (R) finances more than one good in equilibrium Lemma
2 applies, and so the corresponding optimal budget shares are eσDd = σDdX
δ∈EDg
σDδ
(eσRr = σRrX
ρ∈ERg
σRρ
). Let J denote the good jointly financed by the two players, if
any. As will be demonstrated, there will be at most one such good.
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Proposition A1
In a simultaneous move budgetary game over the allocation of funds to
K ≥ 2 collective goods where the relative preferences of the players are described
by assumption 1, there are 2 (K − 1) critical values of the share of the total
resources available to the players controlled by D, α, separating K regions
where ∆ = P and K − 1 regions where ∆ < P = ∆ + 1. In these regions the
Nash-equilibrium strategies and outcomes are as follows
ia) 0 < α < αN1 = σ
R
1 : J = 1
bDN1 = B
D, bDNd = 0 ∀d > 1; bRNr = σRr B − bDr ∀r; XN = XR∗.
ib) αN2(K−1) = 1− σDK < α < 1 : J = K
bDNd = σ
D
d B − bDd ∀d; bRNr = 0 ∀r < K, bDNK = BR; XN = XD∗.
ii) αN2s−1 < α < α
N
2s, s = 1, ...,K − 1 : ∆s = s < Ps = s+ 1
bDNds = eσDdsBD − bRd ∀d ∈ EDNs , bDNds = 0 ∀d /∈ EDNs ; bRNrs = 0 ∀r /∈ ERNs ,
bRNrs = eσRrsBR−bDr ∀r ∈ ERNs ; xNks = eσDksBDqk ∀k ∈ EDNs , xNks = eσRksBRqk ∀k ∈ ERNs .
αN2s−1 =
eσR∆seσD∆s+eσR∆s(1−eσD∆s) , αN2s =
eσRPs(1−eσDPs)eσDPs+eσRPs(1−eσDPs) .
iii) αN2t < α < α
N
2t+1, t = 1, ...,K − 2 : Jt = t+ 1
bDNdt = eσDdt

BD +
X
δ∈EDNt
bRδ

−bRd ∀d ∈ EDNt , bDNdt = 0 ∀d /∈ EDNt ; bRNrt = 0
∀r /∈ ERNt , bRNrt = eσRrt

BR +
X
ρ∈ERNt
bDρ

 − bDr ∀r ∈ ERNt ; xNkt =
eσDktα2t+1B
qk
∀k < Jt, xNJt =
eσDJtα2t+1B
qJt
=
eσRJt (1−α2t)B
qJt
, xNkt =
eσRkt(1−α2t)B
qk
∀k > Jt. αN2t =eσRJt(1−eσDJt)eσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt) , αN2t+1 =
eσRJteσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt) .
Proof:
Regions of type i): a) By lemma 1, at XR∗, ∂U
D
∂b1
> ... > ∂U
D
∂bk
> ... > ∂U
D
∂bK
.
Hence, bDN1 = B
D = αB is the optimal choice for D. The cut-oﬀ rate α1 is
thus the value of such that bRN1 = σ
R
1 B − αB = 0. For α ≤ αN1 = σR1 , D is
unable to move the equilibrium outcome away from XR∗, whereas for α > α1,
the donor can move it closer to XD∗ by allocating its entire budget to good
1. The proof for region ib) involves the same logic with the roles of R and D
reversed. The cut-oﬀ rate is thus the value of α for which 1− α = σDK so that
for α < 1−σDK ≡ αN2(K−1) R is able to increase the equilibrium budgetary share
of good K from σDK by devoting its entire budget to xK .
Regions of type ii): Each player finances a sub-set of all goods. The optimal
budgetary allocation for D is derived from ∂U
D
∂b1
= ... = ∂U
D
∂bδ
= ... = ∂U
D
∂b∆
,
yielding the “second-best” strategy bDNds = eσDds

BD +
X
δ∈EDNs
bRδ

 − bRd ∀d ∈
EDNs . The optimal strategy for R is found in the same fashion. Since each
collective good is financed by only one player, in equilibrium bDNds = eσDdsBD
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∀d ∈ EDNs and bRNrs = eσRrsBR ∀r ∈ ERNs . The lower cut-oﬀ rate is the value of
α for which ∂U
R
∂bs
= ∂U
R
∂bs+1
when D finances goods 1 to s and R funds s+1 to K
in the way just decribed, whereas α2s is found by calculating when ∂U
D
∂bs
= ∂U
D
∂bs+1
under the same conditions.
Regions of type iii): Good t + 1 is jointly financed, i.e., Jt = t + 1. Then
each player sees the resources available for distribution over the goods in EpNt
as Bp plus whatever the other player allocates to J ; as long as the good is not
oversupplied from p’s perspective it may reduce its funding of J and increase
the supply of those goods financed solely by itself. Therefore, in equilibrium
bDNdt = eσDdt ¡BD + bRNJt ¢ − bRd ∀d ∈ EDNs and bRNrt = eσRrt ¡BR + bDNJt ¢ − bDr
∀r ∈ ERNt . Solving for bDNJt and b
RN
Jt
yields bDNJt =
µ
α− eσRJt(1−eσDJt)eσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt)
¶
B ≡¡
α− αN2t
¢
B and bRNJt =
µ eσRJteσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt) − α
¶
B ≡
¡
αN2t+1 − α
¢
B. Hence, the
lower (upper) critical value is when D (R) optimally starts (stops) contributing
to the supply of good J given the optimal funding strategy of R (D). Within
the region, any increase in α will result in a corresponding increase (decrease)
in bDNJt (b
RN
Jt
) so that the equilibrium supply of xJt (and all other goods) stays
the same. Assumption 1 ensures that at most one good can be jointly funded
for the same value of α. For example, assuming two goods, l and m, are jointly
funded implies σ
R
l
σDl
=
σRm
σDm
, which violates this assumption. QED.
Proposition A2
In sequential budgetary games over the allocation of funds to K ≥ 2 collec-
tive goods where the relative preferences of the players are described by assump-
tion 1, there are K + 1 regions with diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes separated
by K cut-oﬀ rates defined in terms of α. In every region except the first and
the last, each good is funded by only one of the players. As α rises above each
critical value between α1 and αK , the collective good with the lowest index
value in ERg moves to EDg. In the first (last) region both players spend on x1
(xK).
Proof:
In a sequential game, the follower chooses its optimal budgetary strategy
given the allocation of funds chosen by the leader. Therefore its equilibrium
strategy is the same as in a Nash-equilibrium. The leader, however, has some
extra degrees of freedom since it can calculate how the follower will respond to
its decision. A slight complication in the game studied here is the fact that one
cannot derive optimal strategies for the leader using calculus because it turns
out not to be in the leader’s interest to let the follower be at an interior solu-
tion with respect to the funding of a good that the leader spends on. However,
it is easy to demonstrate that outcomes will follow the pattern established for
the simultaneous move game with the exception that regions of type iii) do not
occur. I concentrate on proving the non-existence of "interior" equilibria with
joint financing and leave the rest of the proof to the interested reader. Suppose
that D is the leader. The values of α that we are looking at are α ∈
£
αN2t, α
N
2t+1
¤
,
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t = 1, ...,K − 2. Then Proposition A1 informs us that Jt = t + 1 in a Nash-
equilibrium and that R plays bRNrt = eσRrt ¡BR + bDNJt ¢ − bDr r = t + 1, ...,K.
αN2t is defined by
∂UD
∂bt
= ∂U
D
∂bt+1
when bD =
©
bD∗∗1 , ..., b
D∗∗
d , ...b
D∗∗
t+1 , 0, ..., 0
ª
and
bR =
©
0, ..., 0, bR∗∗t+1 , ..., b
R∗∗
r , ..., b
R∗∗
K ,
ª
. Thus, it is the value of at which D just
finds the budgetary share of good t+1 chosen by R "second-best" optimal and
so contributes nothing to the provision of this good. In the same way, αN2t+1
is defined by R’s contribution to the financing of xt+1 reaching zero when D
funds x1 − xt+1 optimally according to its preferences. Hence, for α = αN2t+1
the situation is unchanged by switching to a game where D is the leader: there
is no crowding-out of D’s contribution to the provision of xt+1 as R optimally
chooses bRt+1 = 0 when D selects b
D
t+1 = eσDt+1BD. Similarly, there is no reason
for D to switch strategy at α = αN2t since xt+1 is provided in a "second-best"
optimal manner from its perspective by R. However, for α ∈
¡
αN2t, α
N
2t+1
¢
real-
locating a unit of funds from xt to xt+1 now does not increase spending on this
good by as much because R is at an interior solution for goods xt+1 − xK and
so will reduce its contribution by 1 − eσRt+1 to increase the provision of goods
xt+2 − xK as well. That is, the marginal benefit to D is not ∂U
D
∂xt+1
1
qt+1
but
KX
r=t+1
∂UD
∂xr
1
qr
eσRr . By lemma 1 ∂UD∂xt+1 1qt+1 > ... > ∂UD∂xr 1qr > ... > ∂UD∂xK 1qK when the
budgetary shares of goods xt+1 − xK are "second-best" optimal as judged by
R. Moreover,
KX
r=t+1
eσRr = 1. So ∂UD∂xt+1 1qt+1 > KX
r=t+1
∂UD
∂xr
1
qr
eσRr . The marginal cost
of the reallocation of funds studied is ∂U
D
∂xt
1
qt
. Hence, at the Nash-equilibrium
strategy, where ∂U
D
∂xt
1
qt
= ∂U
D
∂xt+1
1
qt+1
, ∆UD = −∂UD
∂xt
1
qt
+
KX
r=t+1
∂UD
∂xr
1
qr
eσRr < 0 in
a sequential game and so D should reduce bDt+1 to zero. QED.
Proposition A3
For some values of α players are indiﬀerent to the order of moves because
outcomes are the same in the Nash-equilibrium and the sub-game perfect equi-
libria. There are also values of this parameter such that each player at least
weakly prefers being a leader to playing Nash, with being the follower yielding
the worst outcomes according to their preferences.
Proof:
From propositions A1 and A2 it follows that outcomes are the same except
for parameter values such that one of the goods x2 − xK−1 is jointly financed
in the Nash-equilibrium. Therefore, for such values of α players are indiﬀerent
about the order of moves. For α ∈
£
αN2t, α
N
2t+1
¤
, t = 1, ...,K − 2, Stackelberg-
leaders could choose their Nash-equilibrium strategy in the sequential game
and get the Nash-equilibrium outcome. Since they choose not to, they must be
better oﬀ. As the funds not spent on good Jt by the leader is spent on goods
for which the follower’s marginal benefit of spending is lower than for goods Jt
to K, the latter must be worse oﬀ. QED.
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Proposition A4
In a budgetary game with conflict over the provision of two public goods as
described by assumption 1, outcomes does not depend on the order in which
the players move. There are three regions with diﬀerent equilibria, two of which
entail complete control over the outcome by one of the players and one in which
each player devotes their budgets to their priority good, and the kind of equi-
librium realised depends only on α.
Proof:
This involves special cases of the games described in Propositions A1 and
A2, and so is left for the interested reader.
7 Appendix B: Endogenous Budgets
This appendix contains the proof for the case where BD and BR are endoge-
nous. Redefine Epg as the set of collective goods funded by p in equilibrium.
Thus, now eσDd = σDd
σDD+
X
δ∈EDg
σDδ
, d = D, ..., δ, ...,∆, and eσRr = σRr
σRR+
X
ρ∈ERg
σRρ
,
r = P, ..., ρ, ..., R, g = F,L,N . Since Limzp→0
∂Wp
∂zp
= ∞ and the other player
will never spend money on p’s private good, p will always provide zp.
Proposition B1:
In a simultaneous move game with K collective goods and one private good
for each player D and R, there are 2K+1 regions separated by 2K cut-oﬀ rates
defined in terms of the share of total available resources controlled by D, γ. The
Nash-equilibrium strategies and outcomes are
ia) 0 < γ ≤ γN0 =
σDDσ
R
1
σD1 +σ
D
Dσ
R
1
: ∆ = D,P = 1
cDND = Y
D, bDNk = 0, ∀k ∈ X, cDNR = 0; cRND = 0, bRNk = σRk Y R ∀k ∈ X,
cRNR = σ
R
RY
R; zD =
YD
qD
, xNk =
σRk Y
R
qk
∀k ∈ X, zR = σ
R
RY
R
qR
.
ib) γ ≥ γN2K =
σRK
σDKσ
R
R+σ
R
K
: ∆ = K,P = R
cDND = σ
D
d Y
D, bDNk = σ
D
k Y
D ∀k ∈ X,cDNR = 0; cRND = 0, bRNk = 0 ∀k ∈ X,
cRNR = Y
R; zD =
σDd Y
D
qD
, xNk =
σDk Y
D
qk
∀k ∈ X, zR = Y
R
qR
ii) γN2(t−1) < γ ≤ γN2t−1, t = 1, ...,K : Jt = t
cDND = eσDDtY D, bDNdt = eσDdt

Y D +
X
δ∈EDNt
bRδ

 − bRd ∀d ∈ EDNt , bDNdt = 0
∀d /∈ EDNt ,cDNR = 0; cRND = 0, bRNrt = 0 ∀r /∈ ERNt , bRNrt = eσRrt

Y R +
X
ρ∈ERNt
bDρ

−
bDr ∀r ∈ ERNt , cRNR = eσRRtY R; xNkt = eσDktγN2t−1Yqk ∀k < Jt, xNJt = eσDJtγN2t−1YqJt =eσRJt(1−γN2(t−1))Y
qJt
, xNkt =
eσRkt(1−γN2(t−1))Y
qk
∀k > Jt. γN2(t−1) =
eσRJt(1−eσDJt)eσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt) , γN2t−1 =
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eσRJteσDJt+eσRJt(1−eσDJt) .
iii) γNs < γ ≤ γNs+1, s = 1, ..., 2 (K − 1)− 1 : ∆s = s, Ps = s+ 1
cDND = eσDDsY D, bDNds = eσDdsY D−bRd ∀d ∈ EDNs , bDNds = 0 ∀d /∈ EDNs ,cDNR = 0;
cRND = 0, b
RN
rs = 0 ∀r /∈ ERNs , bRNrs = eσRrsY R − bDr ∀r ∈ ERNs , cRNR = eσRRtY R;
xNks =
eσDksY D
qk
∀k ∈ EDNs , xNks =
eσRksY R
qk
∀k ∈ ERNs . γNs =
eσR∆seσD∆s+eσR∆s(1−eσD∆s) , γNs+1 =eσRPs(1−eσDPs)eσDPs+eσRPs(1−eσDPs) .
Proof:
The only change from the proof for Proposition A1 is that the regions
with corner solutions have one of the players only spending on its private
good. Therefore, the lowest cut-oﬀ rate is defined by ∂U
D
∂cD
= ∂U
D
∂b1
when
bD =
©
Y D, ..., 0, ..., 0
ª
and bR = bR∗, whereas the highest is now defined
by ∂U
R
∂cR
= ∂U
R
∂bK
given bD = bD∗ and bR =
©
0, ..., 0, ..., Y R
ª
. QED.
Proposition B2:
In a sequential game game with K collective goods and one private good
for each player D and R, there are K + 1 regions separated by K cut-oﬀ rates
defined in terms of γ. In the first region, only R provides the collective goods; in
the last, only D funds them. In the other regions each collective good is funded
by only one player in such a way that the expenditure ratios between any two
goods provided by that player (including the private good) are first-best optimal
from its perspective, and each cut-oﬀ rate marks the switch in the financing of
a collective good from R to D.
Proof:
Corresponds to that of Proposition A2 with the changes noted in the proof
of Proposition B1. QED.
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Table 1: Goods financed by each player in Nash-equilibrium, K=3 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
x1 D,R D D D D 
x2 R R D,R D D 
x3 R R R R D,R 
 
 
Figure 1a: Nash-equilibrium budgetary shares for x1, K=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Nash-equilibrium budgetary shares for x2, K=3 
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 Figure 1c: Nash-equilibrium budgetary shares for x3, K=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Sub-game perfect equilibrium budgetary shares for x1, K=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Sub-game perfect equilibrium budgetary shares for x2, K=3 
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Figure 2c: Sub-game perfect equilibrium budgetary shares for x3, K=3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes as functions of BD, K=2 
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Figure 4: The non-strategic approach to fungibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Goods financed by each player in equilibrium when budgets are endogenous 
g/g  (0, g0N] (g0N , g1N] (g1N, g2N] (g2N, g3N] >g3N 
N: D zD zD, x1 zD, x1 zD, x1, x2 zD, x1, x2 
 R x1, x2, zR x1, x2, zR x2, zR x2, zR zR 
L D zD zD zD, x1 zD, x1 zD, x1, x2 
 R x1, x2, zR x1, x2, zR x2, zR x2, zR zR 
F D zD zD, x1 zD, x1 zD, x1, x2 zD, x1, x2 
 R x1, x2, zR x2, zR x2, zR zR zR 
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